Boston thought its police license plate data would stay in Boston. Then, just three days into a camera trial in April 2025, officials learned that other law enforcement agencies could search the city’s records. The contract said outside sharing was supposed to be off. According to the city’s later surveillance report, it wasn’t.
That sounds like a technical mistake. But it raises a question that matters far beyond Boston: when a police camera records your car, who else might be able to look up that information? Another town? Another state? A private company?
WBUR’s September 2026 reporting on Boston’s official report said a nationwide search setting had been enabled in error and was turned off after the city discovered it. The report did not establish which outside agencies, if any, actually searched Boston’s records during those first three days. Being able to see information is not proof that anyone did see it. That difference matters.
Why would police share plate records at all?
Consider a stolen car that leaves one town and enters another. An investigator may have only a plate number and a description of the vehicle. A recent camera sighting in a neighboring jurisdiction could save valuable time. The same approach may help in searches for missing people or in serious criminal investigations.
The technology doesn’t have to stop working at a city boundary. That’s one of the reasons law enforcement agencies value access to records collected elsewhere. But the fact that sharing can help in a legitimate investigation doesn’t answer every question about who should have routine access.
Boston offers a useful example. After the city corrected the initial setting, it received 77 requests for access during the remainder of its 2025 pilot, according to the report described by WBUR. The requests involved different agencies and investigations, including serious crimes. The public report did not make clear which requests were approved. A request and permission to search are not the same thing.
When people say “sharing,” what actually happens?
Sometimes an officer in one department can directly search records another department has agreed to make available. That is standing access. It may make investigations faster, but it also means the department that collected the records is relying on people outside its own organization to follow appropriate rules.
In other situations, an outside investigator has to ask the collecting department for help with a particular case. That department decides whether the request is permitted and may conduct the search itself. It’s more work, but it gives the original department an opportunity to review the reason before releasing anything.
Then there’s the company running the software. A vendor may host the records and provide access controls without being allowed to use them for its own purposes. Flock Safety says its customers control their data and choose whether to share through a wider network. That is the company’s stated policy, not evidence that every configuration always works correctly. Boston’s experience shows why checking actual settings matters.
How big can a sharing network become?
A November 9, 2026 Pew Research Center analysis examined information from 1,517 agencies that voluntarily published Flock transparency portals. Among agencies disclosing their sharing arrangements, the median reported sharing access with 217 other organizations, mostly law enforcement agencies.
That’s not a claim that every police department in America shares with 217 agencies. Pew studied the agencies with public portals, and not all of them provided sharing information. Still, the finding helps explain why the rules in one city may affect people far beyond that city’s borders.
And access does not mean an outside officer is constantly following every car. Each plate observation is a record of a particular place and time. How much can be learned depends on the cameras involved, how long information is kept, what can be searched and what rules are enforced.
What happens when a record crosses state lines?
There isn’t one set of sharing rules for the whole country. The National Conference of State Legislatures reported in September 2026 that at least 16 states had laws setting out when plate reader information may be shared or limiting particular kinds of sharing. Other rules may come from city policy, a police department or a vendor contract.
California is one example. Its Civil Code section 1798.90.55 restricts public agencies from selling, sharing or transferring license plate reader information except to another public agency when otherwise permitted by law. California’s attorney general interprets that restriction as barring local police from sharing those records with federal and out of state agencies.
That interpretation became the subject of a real dispute. In October 2025, Attorney General Rob Bonta sued El Cajon, alleging its police department had shared records with numerous out of state agencies in violation of California law. The state continued its legal challenge in January 2026. City officials disputed the state’s position, and El Cajon police described investigations in which sharing helped locate suspects in other states. A lawsuit allegation isn’t a final court ruling; the outcome of that specific challenge has not been verified here.
Washington’s 2026 law takes a different approach, spelling out limits on data disclosure, direct outside access, vendor permissions and sales. It permits certain sharing and access under defined circumstances, rather than making police records a free for all. The details of those exceptions matter. The law also makes clear that agencies cannot simply buy and sell plate data.
New Mexico requires another safeguard. Under its 2026 rules, an agency seeking to share with certain outside parties must first obtain a written declaration that the information won’t be used for prohibited purposes. Los Alamos County’s police information page explains the state’s new law and its limits. That doesn’t prove every request will be handled properly, but it creates a record of what the recipient promised.
Could these records be used for taxes, tickets or tolls?
Not every camera that reads a license plate belongs to the police. Florida’s TOLL-BY-PLATE program, for example, photographs plates to bill drivers who use certain toll roads without a compatible transponder. Parking systems may check permits or enforce parking restrictions. Those systems have their own legal purposes and rules.
What if police collected the plate record for an investigation and a different agency wanted to use it to collect money? That is another question entirely. The answer depends on who collected the information, what law permits its use, what sharing restrictions apply and whether any court order is required.
In Kansas, Overland Park’s revised police policy specifically restricts certain uses connected to enforcing tax or immigration laws outside the department’s jurisdiction. That is a local departmental restriction, not a nationwide prohibition on toll billing, parking enforcement or every possible tax investigation. We shouldn’t treat different systems as though they all have the same purpose.
If a rule says “no sharing,” how can anyone know it works?
A promise in a contract is one starting point. The next questions are practical ones. Can another agency log in directly? Who approves new users? Does every search identify the officer and the investigation? Will someone check whether sharing settings change after a software update?
There are reasons to look beyond the contract. In Boston, the intended restriction and the initial software setting didn’t match. In Chicago, officials have been examining how their officers access other agencies’ systems. Our Chicago report describes that review, while our Boston report looks more closely at the city trial and its aftermath.
One final distinction is worth remembering: a database may log who searched for your plate without telling you that a search occurred. Public transparency reports can help residents understand the program, but published summaries are not the same as an independent audit of every individual search.
For a fuller explanation of what cameras record and how long it may remain available, see our guide to what happens to license plate data. The real question isn’t simply whether police have a useful investigative tool. It’s whether people can learn who else has access, what that access is for and what happens when the rules aren’t followed.
Sources and further reading
WBUR, September 14, 2026, Boston surveillance report; Pew Research Center, November 9, 2026, Flock transparency portal analysis; Flock Safety, vendor trust and data sharing descriptions; NCSL, updated September 28, 2026, ALPR statutes by state.
California Civil Code 1798.90.55; California Attorney General, October 3, 2025, El Cajon lawsuit announcement; California Attorney General, January 21, 2026, legal challenge update; inewsource, December 10, 2025, El Cajon police and legal perspectives.
Washington RCW 10.130.050, prohibited sharing practices; Washington RCW 10.130.030, permitted uses; Los Alamos County, New Mexico law overview; Florida’s Turnpike, Toll By Plate.
This article provides general information, not legal advice. Laws and reported developments were reviewed on November 11, 2026.
ALPRNews uses AI tools to assist with research, writing and editing. Read our editorial standards and reader notice.